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that under Utah law; dismissal of a petition for an extraordinary writ on grounds of
laches in a written opinion is a decision "on the merits" such, that later adjudication
o" lie siiirii clam. '•• barred. "[Wjheri a court of competent jurisdiction has
adjudicated directly upon a particular matter, the same point is not open to inquiry
>i lbsequei it action foi 1:1: le san le cai lse at: id bet vv eei: 1 it: le sai lie par ties " " G ates t

true regardless of whether the court directly adjudicates the plaintiffs substantive
claims or "says"to the plaintiff 'you are too late.""" Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. i \
City of Chi

—' ".2d 1 - R

1^3 (7lh H-

1987). In sillier ease, the decision

"may be ' on the merits' for purposes of preclusion,' Id.
I he FI DS Association urges the Court, to disregai, -uis precedent a; - , .
that if a I J tall: I coi :i::i: t issues a \ v rittei i opii lion dismissing a petition foi e::: ;:: I* writ on grounds of laches, the preclusive effect depends on a number oi
"circumstances," including whether the "laches determination is based on actual
litigation of the underlying facts" in a "feet-finding coiirt," and whethe- a "\v\ic and
thorough lacucs analysis was applied."'' I ""I' DS Bi 3 1 As explained i-elow =iK-se
"circui i istai ices' ' f it id t 10 si lppoi t it: i tl le case law o:t: logic.
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Rather, it appears that the FLDS Association's multi-factor analysis is
designed to obscure the fact that in Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of

{

Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ^|1, 238 P.3d 1054, this Court
expressly held that the FLDS Association's constitutional claims were barred by

<

laches: "We hold that because the FLDS Association has delayed this challenge
for nearly three years, and because during this time, many parties have engaged in
i

numerous transactions in reliance on the Trust's modification, the FLDS
Association's trust modification claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of
i

laches." That this Court could have dismissed the petition on purely discretionary
grounds, or, in the Association's view, should TW/Vhave found laches on the record
here, is irrelevant to the preclusive effect of the decision. What is relevant is that
this Court, after thorough consideration of the record and the Utah law of laches,
actually did hold the FLDS Association's claims barred by laches. Nothing in the

(

Court's laches analysis depended on the fact that the issue arose in the context of a
petition for extraordinary writ. This Court cited the same case law, analyzed the
same factors, and based its holding on the same considerations it would use if a
question of laches arose in any other type of proceeding.

Under these
i

"circumstances," this Court's finding of laches in Lindberg should not be subject to
relitigation in federal court simply because it was issued in the context of an
extraordinary writ proceeding.
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Indeed, the FLDS Association has failed to provide any logical reason why
it—or any other plaintiff whose writ action has been dismissed on laches
grounds—should be permitted to litigate its claim in successive actions. Laches
and res judicata are both intended to promote repose and protect reliance interests.
Allowing a tardy plaintiff to relitigate a claim that was barred by laches in an
earlier writ action undermines these important public policies. Likewise, adopting
the FLDS Association's proposed "general rule" limiting the preclusive effect of
decisions made in the context of original actions would have far-ranging and
negative consequences. It would effectively render a written decision by this Court
denying a petition for extraordinary writ to be little more than an advisory opinion.
ARGUMENT
The FLDS Association's brief starts from the premise that this Court lacks
"jurisdiction" to resolve the "preclusive effect" ofFundamentalist Church of Jesus
1

Compare, e.g., Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U.S. 556, 566 (1890) ("The doctrine of
laches is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires for the peace of
society the discouragement of stale demands."), with Nevada v. United States, 463
U.S. 110, 129 (1983) (res judicata "ensures 'the very object for which civil courts
have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the
settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is
essential to the maintenance of social order; for, the aid of judicial tribunals would
not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property, if ...
conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals.'") (omission in
original); see also Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000) (stating that "the
basic policies of all limitations provisions" is to provide "repose, elimination of
stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiffs opportunity for recovery and a
defendant's ... liability].").
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054, and thus can
only opine on "abstract" questions of law. FLDS Br. 4-7. Indeed, the FLDS

i

Association goes as far as saying this Court cannot even "discuss Lindberg at all."
Id. at 7.

i

The FLDS Association does not seriously dispute that a prior decision
dismissing a claim on laches grounds can be preclusive and that decisions by this
Court in the context of a Rule 65B petition can be preclusive. .Id at 3-4, 14-15.
The Association, however, contends the preclusive effect of the denial of a Rule
{

65B petition depends on the "express terms" of the opinion and a number of
"circumstances" that just happen to be present in this case and might be viewed as
giving the Association grounds to return to the Tenth Circuit and argue that
Lindberg does not bar its federal -action against Judge Lindberg and the Fiduciary.
Id. at 2-4, 7-25. That results-oriented proposal should be rejected. As discussed
below, the FLDS Association misapprehends the scope of this Court's jurisdiction,
and there is no justification for adopting its multi-factored res judicata test,
regardless of whether the various factors are viewed in the abstract or as applied to
the facts of this case.
1. Notwithstanding the FLDS Association's assertion to the contrary, id. at
7, this Court may answer the certified question with reference to the Lindberg
decision. The Utah Supreme Court has "original jurisdiction to answer questions

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of state law certified by a court of the United States." Utah Code Ann. §78A-3102(1). To ensure that the Court has the information necessary to answer certified
questions, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(c)(2) requires the certifying court
to "set forth all facts which are relevant to the determination of the question
certified and which show the nature of the controversy, the context in which the
question arose, and the procedural steps by which the question was framed."
Those requirements are met here.
The question of the preclusive effect of Lindberg is undoubtedly a question
of Utah law. Indeed, the FLDS Association conceded this point in the federal
district court and agreed that if Lindberg "is considered to be on the merits for res
judicata purposes" under Utah law, the federal courts are "bound by the Utah
Supreme Court's finding of laches and must dismiss the case." Aplt.App.56.
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit's certification order specifically discusses Lindberg
and explains how that decision led the court to certify the question of the
preclusive effect of a Utah court's denial of a petition for extraordinary writ on
grounds of laches. See Order Certifying State Law Questions at 8-11, Doc. No.
01018803969 (10th Cir, Mar. 2, 2012). There is, therefore, no jurisdictional bar or
procedural rule preventing this Court from answering the certified question with
reference to Lindberg or the particular facts of this case. Cf Shoemaker v. City of
Bremerton, 745 P.2d 858, 859 (Wash. 1987) (deciding, on certification from the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(

Ninth Circuit, whether ^Washington law affordfs] preclusive effect to the factual
findings of the Bremerton Civil Service Commission that Joe Shoemaker's

*

reductions in rank were not retaliatory").
Nor is there any prudential reason for this Court to answer the certified

<

question at an abstract level of generality that could result in additional disputes
about the scope of Utah law on this issue.

It does not "promot[e] efficiency, or

otherwise serv[e] the objectives of the question certification process/5 for this
Court to return "an answer to the federal court which all concerned know" will
spawn "additional state law questions." Miller v. United States, 2004 UT 96, ^|8,
.104 P.3d 1202.

u

The question certification procedure represents a unique
exercise of [this Court's] original jurisdiction. Unlike . . . traditional
appellate review, [the Court is] not presented with a decision to affirm
or reverse. Instead, [it is] being approached for guidance. [The
Court] should respond to these requests guided by a desire to provide
meaningful and comprehensive assistance which, under certain
circumstances, may require a more expansive answer than a literal
reading of the certified question may warrant.

^

Id 110.
The need for guidance is particularly acute here because there are several
cases pending in state and federal courts that raise a similar question about the
preclusive effect of Lindberg.2 Litigation challenging the constitutionality of the

2

See, e.g., Wisan v. City of Hildale, Utah Supreme Court Case No. 20100993
(filed Dec. 12, 2012) (challenging the Special Fiduciary's authority to subdivide
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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-•<

reformation of the UEP Trust has been costly and time-consuming for all
concerned.

A decision about the preclusive effect of Lindberg itself would

promote efficiency and enhance the ability of Utah courts to make final
determinations about the control and disposition of the Trust's assets.
2. The FLDS Association's primary argument is that, as a "[g]eneral [r]ule,"
"[d]enials of extraordinary writs do not preclude subsequent litigation of the
underlying substantive claims."

FLDS Br. 7.

That argument, however, is

inconsistent with this Court's holding in Gates v. Taylor, 2000 UT 33, ff 1-2, 997
P.2d 903, that where a petition for extraordinary writ is denied in a written opinion
that "is clear that the matter was decided on the merits," the "petitioners are barred
by the doctrine of res judicata from seeking the same relief from another court.
Trust land); In re United Effort Plan Trust, Utah Supreme Court Case No.
20090691 (filed Aug. 27, 2009) (challenging Judge Lindberg's denial of motions
by FLDS members to intervene in the probate proceedings to challenge the impact
of the Trust reformation and administration); Colorado City v. United Effort Plan
Trust, No. 3:ll-cv-08037-DGC (D. Ariz., filed Mar. 11, 2011) (Colorado City
seeking a declaration that the reformation of the Trust was unconstitutional and
therefore the Special Fiduciary has no authority to administer Trust land in
Colorado City and the City has no obligation to deal with him or residents of Trust
land occupying homes pursuant to an occupancy agreement negotiated with the
Special Fiduciary); Cooke et al v. Colorado City, et al, No. 3:10-cv-08105-JAT
(D. Ariz., filed June 24, 2010) (Colorado City defending lawsuit by the State of
Arizona and Ron and Jinjer Cooke for the refusal of Colorado City to provide
water to the Cookes on the ground that the Trust reformation was unconstitutional
and the Special Fiduciary had no authority to enter into the occupancy agreement
at issue); Jessop v. Wisan, S-8015-cv-20082047 Sup. Ct. Mohave Cnty. Ariz, (filed
Nov. 7, 2008) (FLDS members challenging the sale of Trust property on the
grounds that the reformation of the Trust is unconstitutional).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

The FLDS Association apparently recognizes this point, because elsewhere in its
brief it asserts (without any discussion or reasoning) that Gates is limited to its
facts—namely, to cases in which the petitioner files a successive Rule 65B
petition. See FLDS Br. 3-4.
Gates cannot be read so narrowly. Using reasoning that contradicts the
FLDS Association's cramped reading, this Court emphasized that u[s]ound policy,
principles of judicial economy, and fairness to the parties require that final
judgments on the merits be subject only to proper appellate review and not to
successive relitigation in new courts."

Gates, 2000 UT 33, ^[3, 997 P.2d 903

(emphasis added). This Court went on to hold that "fwjhen a court of competent
jurisdiction has adjudicated directly upon a particular matter, the same point is not
open to inquiry in a subsequent action for the same cause and between the same
parties"

Id. (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). Thus nothing in Gates—or

logic—supports the FLDS Association's assertion that the dismissal of a writ on
the merits bars relitigation of the claim or issue only in a successive Rule 65B
petition, but not in a different type of action.
3

The FLDS Association's observation (at 13) that the Utah Constitution no longer
requires this Court to issue a written opinion when it enters judgment on the merits
supports our position here. By issuing a thorough, written opinion in a context
where it was under no obligation to do so, this Court clearly demonstrated that it
had "adjudicated directly upon a particular matter" such that "the same point is not
open to inquiry in a subsequent action for the same cause and between the same
parties." Gates, 2000 UT 33, p , 997 P.2d 903.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The FLDS Association also suggests that its position is consistent with the
majority rule in other courts, but the treatise that it cites (at 10) establishes the very
opposite point.
Disposition of requests for relief by injunction or extraordinary writ
poses few distinctive preclusion problems. All that is required is
careful attention to the nature of the initial proceeding and the basis of
decision.
18A Wright, Miller, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 2002), §4445;
see also E. T. Tsai, Annotation, Judgment Granting or Denying Writ of Mandamus
or Prohibition as Res Judicata, 21 A.L.R. 3d 206 §2 (it is "well settled that the
doctrine of res judicata is applicable to judgments in mandamus and prohibition
proceedings") (footnotes omitted). As our opening brief explains, numerous courts
have given preclusive effect to decisions made in the context of extraordinary writ
actions, where, like here, there is a written opinion showing that the Court
"adjudicated directly" a disputed claim or issue. Wisan-Lindberg Br. 36-37 (citing
cases).
3. The FLDS Association does not seriously dispute that courts have given
preclusive effect to decisions holding a claim barred by laches (or, relatedly, by an
applicable statute of limitations, failure to prosecute or undue delay). Instead, the
FLDS Association contends that a laches determination made by an "appellate"
court (rather than a "trial" court) cannot be given res judicata effect. FLDS Br. 1112. According to the FLDS Association, laches is "a question of fact" and an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q

appellate court cannot make the necessary factual findings. Id. This contention is
i

unavailing.
a. When this Court or the Utah Court of Appeals rules on a Rule 65B
petition for an extraordinary writ, it exercises its original jurisdiction. See Gates,
2000 UT 33, f3, 992 P.2d 903. In such cases, the Court may consider the evidence
presented by the parties in support of the petition and opposition, as well as the
record of the judicial proceeding for which the writ is sought, and make the factual
findings necessary for its decision. See, e.g., Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79,
1ff[2-7, 149 P.3d 352 (making factual findings about a district court's general
practice concerning preservation of affidavits used to obtain search warrants and
the steps it took to preserve the affidavit in Anderson's particular case). Indeed, in
holding that there is no statute of limitations for Rule 65B petitions, but that a
petition may be dismissed on grounds of laches, Renn v. Utah State Bd. of
Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah 1995), this Court necessarily determined that
appellate courts can make the factual determinations necessary to determine
whether the laches criteria are met. There is, therefore, no basis for the FLDS
Association's assertion that this Court's dismissal of a petition for extraordinary
writ on grounds of laches has no preclusive effect because the "facts underlying the
laches defense were not litigated." FLDS Br. 3,12.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

b. To the extent the FLDS Association implies that it did not have the
opportunity to contest disputed factual issue relevant to this Court's laches finding,
FLDS Br. 12, such an assertion is patently incorrect. The FLDS Association chose
to file the Rule 65B action and to stay its federal district court action pending this
Court's resolution of that petition. If the FLDS Association had thought there were
disputed issues of material fact that could not properly be resolved in an original
action, it should not have brought the petition or, at a minimum, should have made
that argument in the writ action and sought rehearing of this Court's decision. The
FLDS Association cannot avoid the consequences of its prior litigation strategy by
resorting to "successive litigation in new courts." Gates, 2000 UT 33, p , 997 P.2d
903; see also, e.g., Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustments, 2002 UT 77, f20, 52
P.3d 1267 (litigants who fail to appeal adverse judgments "are bound by the
judgment and may not relitigate an issue they already had an opportunity to
litigate").4
In any event, the FLDS Association does not assert that it was unable to
offer relevant evidence to support its petition for extraordinary writ. Nor has it
identified any disputed issue of material fact that this Court improperly resolved.
This Court had the benefit of the record of the underlying probate proceedings, cf
Likewise incorrect is the FLDS Association alternative suggestion that as an
original action this Court's decision in Lindberg did not make any factual findings.
Compare FLDS Br. 12, with 2010 UT 51,ffl[30-35,238 P.3d 1054.
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FLDS Br. 12, and the FLDS Association does not—and cannot—dispute that its
members were on notice of the reformation of the Trust by Judge Lindberg yet
waited nearly three years before seeking to challenge the decision. See Lindberg,
2010 UT 51, Tf30, 238 P.3d 1054. Indeed, counsel for the FLDS Association
effectively conceded that point to this Court.

<

Aplt.App.4119, 4127-4129.

Likewise, the FLDS Association does not dispute that third-parties, such as the
original Tort Plaintiffs, relied on the reformation of the Trust and that no party
appealed that decision. See Lindberg, 2010 UT 51,ffl[33-34,238 P.3d 1054. The
FLDS Association simply disagrees with this Court's legal conclusion that these
factsdemonstrate laches.
This is confirmed by the FLDS Association's reliance on the federal district
court's critique of the Lindberg decision. FLDS Br. 18-20. The federal district
court held noevidentiary hearing before rejecting this Court's findings that laches
should apply in these circumstances.

See Aplt.App.1-21. Further, the federal

district court did not dispute any of this Court's core factual findings that the FLDS
Association had notice of the Trust reformation and that third parties reasonably
relied on that reformation when it was not appealed. Rather, the federal district
court found that such facts were insufficient to establish laches because of the
potential "merits" of the FLDS Association's constitutional claims and because the
"tort lawsuit settlements certainly can be dealt with by the same legal system one
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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would expect to be able to allow these plaintiffs to somewhere obtain a ruling on
the merits of their constitutional claims." Aplt.App.55, 61-42. That the FLDS
Association and the district court disagree with Lindberg is not a sufficient reason
for denying it preclusive effect.
4. In another variation on the same theme, the FLDS Association asserts
that courts have adopted "the general rule that laches dismissals lack preclusive
effect unless they fully litigate the merits." FLDS Br. 15; see also id. at 4
(dismissal on laches ground should be considered to have preclusive effect only if
the second court concludes, after "careful[] analy[sis]," that the original decision
undertook a "true and thorough laches analysis," including the merits of plaintiff s
Underlying claim). Again, no such "general rule" exists.
a. It is well-established that a judgment based on an affirmative defense
may be "on the merits" for purposes of res judicata even though it did not consider
the "merits" of plaintiffs substantive claims. As we demonstrated in our opening
brief (at 27-28), although a judgment must be "'on the merits'" to bar subsequent
litigation of the same claim between the same parties, it is a "misconception of res
judicata to assume that the doctrine does not come into operation if a court has not
passed on the 'merits' in the sense of the ultimate substantive issues of a
litigation."

Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 190 (1947).

Rather, "[a]n

adjudication declining to reach such ultimate substantive issues may bar a second
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

attempt to reach them in another court of the State/' because the "'merits' of a
claim are disposed of when [they are] refused enforcement." Id.

. *

Thus, courts have routinely applied res judicata to prior decisions finding a
claim barred by statute of limitations or laches without "carefully analyzing]"

<

whether the original court engaged in a "true and thorough" analysis of the
"merits" of the plaintiffs substantive claims, See, e.g., Smith v. City of Chi, 820
F.2d 916, 918-19 (7th Cir. 1987); Am. Nat'I Bank & Trust, 826 F.2d at 1553;
Cannon v. Loyola Univ. of Chi, 784 F.2d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 1986); Rose v. Town
of Harwich, 778 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.); State v. Cahoon, 2009 UT
9, f 14, 203 P.3d 957. If a court says to the plaintiff "'you are too late' or otherwise
wraps up a case in a way that indicates that the plaintiff has irrevocably failed," the
decision "may be 'on the merits' for purposes of preclusion even though the court
did not resolve the merits" of the plaintiff s underlying claim. Am. Nat'l Bank &

{

Trust, 826 F.2d at 1553; see also Cahoon, 2009 UT 9, |14, 203 P.3d 957 (res
judicata can bar relitigation of a claim dismissed on statute of limitations grounds).
Notably, the FLDS Association does not explain why its proposed rule
would make sense, and, as we explained in our opening brief, it does not. Wisani

Lindberg Br. 27-33. If courts were to relax principles of res judicata whenever
they thought a litigant had a strong claim on the merits, the doctrine "would fail to
serve its purposes of promoting judicial economy and repose." Rose, 778 F.2d at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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82; see also FederatedDep't. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398-99 (1981)
(relitigation of the correctness of the original decision "undermine[s] . . . the very
purpose of the doctrine of res judicata").

A defendant with a valid affirmative

defense should not be forced to incur the unnecessary and inappropriate costs of
litigating the substantive merits of the underlying claims in another lawsuit.
Indeed, it would make no sense to weigh the "merits" of a plaintiffs claim
in assessing the preclusive effect of a dismissal based on an affirmative defense
that applies regardless of the potential merits of the claim. See infra n.5. For
example, it would be completely illogical to ask whether the original court gave
sufficient attention to the "merits" of claims held barred by the statute of
limitations. The FLDS Association offers no explanation why a different rule
should apply to the related concept of laches, which serves an analogous function
to statutes of limitations in the context of petitions for an extraordinary writ. Renn,
904 P.2d at 684. And, unsurprisingly, as we previously demonstrated, the two
cases cited by the FLDS Association for its supposed "general rule" do not
announce a different standard. Wisan-Lindberg Br. 33 & n.8.
b. The FLDS Association's theory seems to rest on the notion that a Utah
court must consider and weigh the "merits" of a plaintiffs underlying claim in
determining whether laches applies. FLDS Br. 4, 15. But even if this Court's
precedents prohibited a dismissal on laches grounds unless the merits of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plaintiffs substantive claims were discussed in the opinion—and it does not appear
to impose any such requirement5—whether a decision dismissing a claim on laches
grounds correctly analyzed the merits of the plaintiffs claim is legally irrelevant to
whether the decision has preclusive effect.6 The "res judicata consequences" of a
final judgment are not "altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong " Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 398; see also, e.g., Collins, 2002 UT
77, ^[18, 52 P.3d 1267 (same). To the extent that the original court made a legal
error (here, in the FLDS Association's view, the putative failure of this Court in
Lindberg to give proper weight to the "merits" of the Association's constitutional
claims, FLDS Br. 4), the remedy is to raise that argument to the original court or
on review, not to relitigate the issue or claim in another court. Federated Dep't
Stores, 452 U.S. at 398-401; Collins, 2002 UT 77, ^19, 52 P.3d 1267.
•>>••••--

—

•

•

•

•

The

• "

As Lindberg itself determined, "laches has two elements: (1) a party's lack of
diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that lack of diligence." Lindberg, 2010
UT 51, ^{27, 238 P.3d 1054; see also Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671
P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) ("To constitute laches, two elements must be
established: (1) The lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; [and] (2) An injury to
defendant owing to such lack of diligence.'") (alteration in original) (quoting
Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256,
1260 (Utah 1975)). Laches is an equitable doctrine developed to discourage stale
claims and protect reliance interests even where a plaintiffs claims may be
potentially meritorious. See supra p. 3.
6

Notably, although Lindberg did not specifically discuss the relative strength of
the FLDS Association's constitutional claims, its laches analysis appeared to
assume arguendo those claims were potentially meritorious. See 2010 UT 51, ^|26,
238 P.3d 1054.
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Association's contrary rule would "upset the general and well established doctrine
of res judicata, conceived in the light of the maxim that the interest of the state
requires that there be an end to litigation—a maxim which comports with common
sense as well as public policy."

Collins, 2002 UT 77, ^fl9, 52 P.3d 1267

(quotations omitted).
5. Finally, the FLDS cannot avoid the preclusive effect of Lindberg by
contending that the reformation of the Trust violated "structural" prohibitions of
the Establishment Clause and that such violations can never be barred by laches.
FLDS Br. 21-25. This argument is first and foremost an impermissible attempt to
avoid the preclusive effect of a prior decision by arguing that it is incorrect. As
previously noted, see supra p. 16, "'an erroneous conclusion reached by the court
in the first suit does not deprive the defendants in the second action of the right to
rely upon the plea of res judicata.'" Collins, 2002 UT 77, f 18,- 52 P.3d 1267
(quoting FederatedDep yt Stores, 452 U.S. at 398).
In addition, this argument was necessarily rejected by the Tenth Circuit
when it certified the state law question to this Court. Before the Tenth Circuit, the
FLDS Association defended the preliminary injunction issued by the federal
district court by arguing that its Establishment Clause claims could not be barred
by laches (or otherwise waived). See Brief of FLDS at 16, Doc. No. 01018736073
(10th Cir. Oct. 27, 2011). Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit certified to this Court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the question of the preclusive effect of the dismissal of a petition for extraordinary
writ on grounds of laches. Because certification is proper only if a question of
Utah law is "a controlling issue of law in a proceeding pending before the
certifying court," Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(1)(B), the Tenth Circuit could not have
certified the question of the preclusive effect of a dismissal on the grounds of
laches if, as the FLDS Association now argues, laches cannot bar Establishment
Clause claims. See Order Certifying State Law Questions at 8, 14-15, Doc. No.
1018803969 (issuing the certification order pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 41); see also id. at 8 ("The resolution of this question of Utah law will
likely control the outcome in appeals pending before our court.").
In all events, the FLDS Association is wrong that the reformation of the
Trust violated the Establishment Clause arid that claims alleging Establishment
Clause violations cannot be barred if untimely,
a. It is well established that constitutional challenges are barred if untimely.
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 1998) (constitutional
claims barred by statute of limitations); Souths ide Fair Hous. Comm. v. City of
New York, 928 F.2d 1336 (2d Cir. 1991) (Establishment Claim barred by laches);
Perry v. Judd, 2012 WL 113865, at *6-7 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2012), affd, 2012 WL
120076 (4th Cir. Jan. 17, 2012) (First and Fourteenth Amendment claims barred by
laches).

The FLDS Association cannot avoid this result by asserting that an
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Establishment Clause violation "cannot be cured by the passage of time." FLDS
Br. 22. In Hair v. United States, 350 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2003), plaintiffs
attempted to bring untimely taking claims by similarly arguing that "if Congress
lacks the constitutional power to take private property without paying for it, how
can it suddenly get the power after six years or any other designated period of
elapsed time?" The Federal Circuit rejected the argument for reasons that are
equally applicable here: American law has long recognized that "a plaintiff cannot
sleep on his or her rights, and then suddenly demand a remedy, without creating a
greater wrong against the party charged, and a wrong against the peace of the
community." Id. at 1256.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that "[a]

constitutional claim can become time-barred just as any other claim can. Nothing
in the Constitution requires otherwise." Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 292
(1983) (citations omitted).
b. The FLDS Association's argument also assumes that it has stated a viable
Establishment Clause violation. It has not. The First Amendment does not require
the probate court to ignore the cy pres doctrine, Utah Code Ann. §75-7-413, or to
sanction, in contravention of Utah law, id. §75-7-106, the inequitable result of
allowing "the President of the FLDS Church, who violated his fiduciary duties to
thousands of potential Trust beneficiaries, to benefit (directly or indirectly) from
assets consecrated by those individuals as part of their personal quest for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sanctification," Aplt.App.1590 n.86. To the contrary, a State is "constitutionally
entitled to adopt neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church
property dispute." Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979). As was done here,
such "neutral-principles approach" permits a court to resolve a church property
dispute through the application of "well-established concepts of trust and property
law." Id. at 603; see also Synanon Found., Inc. v. California, 444 U.S. 1307, 130708 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.) (stay denial).
Indeed, more than a century ago the Supreme Court upheld Congress's
legislative use of the cypres doctrine to seize property of a church that engaged in
unlawful acts and to use the property for secular charitable purposes chosen by the
government. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 48-52 (1890). The seizure of church property in that
case, the Court later explained, was "bottomed on the general rule that where a
charitable corporation is dissolved for unlawful practices, the sovereign takes and
distributes the property according to the cy-pres doctrine to objects of charity."
Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 120
(1952) (citations omitted). "A failure of the charitable purpose could have the
same effect." Id. Thus, the probate court's application of the cy pres doctrine to
modify the Trust to further only its legitimate charitable purpose and not illegal
acts was consistent with Supreme Court precedent and "cannot be said to 'inhibit'

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
id may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

the free exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state law
governing the manner in which churches own property, hire employees, or
purchase goods." Jones, 443 U.S. at 606.
CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that under Utah law, dismissal of a petition for an
extraordinary writ on grounds of laches in a written opinion is a decision "on the
merits" such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred. Accordingly, this
Court should further confirm that its decision in Fundamentalist Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P3d 1054, was on the
merits and that no party or privity of any party can relitigate any claim that was or
could have been raised in that matter.
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